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Abstract 
 
Since the publication of Kenneth Pomeranz’s seminal book The Great Divergence, the landscape of world and 
global history has changed dramatically. For the first time, living standards, instead of labour, land and capital 
productivities, have become the prime concern among historians in various parts of the world. 
 
The key to this decade-long debate hinges on quantity and quality of information for transnational and cross-
regional comparisons. But due to the obvious constraints we historians constantly face, genuinely good data 
are frustratingly hard to obtain and thus set the upper limits for what we can possibly achieve. 
 
The task of the present study is to put some currently circulated nominal wages for the Ming-Qing Period 
(1368-1911) under the microscope to check their feasibility. Our main findings from Chinese sources suggest 
that published cash wages did not reflect the actual living wages needed in reality to support a worker and his 
family of the average size. This means that we may have been barking at the wrong tree. 
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In recent decades economic historians have resituated the scientific, technological and 
economic achievements of Western societies in a global context. Their classical 
predecessors, particularly Max Weber, Karl Marx and Adam Smith, left them with 
approaches, a vocabulary and several suggestive hypotheses that have been taken forward, 
modified and also rejected by two generations of post-war research, exploring models and 
narratives that purport to explain the rise of the West.1 There are now libraries of books and 
articles dealing with Asian agricultures, industries, towns, commercial networks, 
communications, trade, science, technologies, cultures, business organization, taxation, 
state systems, government policies etc., etc., covering the last millennium.2 Some are by 
academics from universities, not long emancipated from colonial rule. 3  Most of this 
impressive, but still far from comprehensive, volume of research in history and the social 
sciences has been written largely by specialists in area studies from North American, 
European, Australian and Japanese universities. Not long after the second world war and 
during the era of decolonization scholars were offered an opportunity provided by the 
accumulation of an extensive body of knowledge – long available about Europe and North 
America, but emerging on Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America – to reposition 
their hitherto disconnected analyses of wealth and poverty, one against the other, in order to 
construct global economic histories that might have satisfied the aspirations of Montesquieu, 
Voltaire, Smith and their ‘enlightened’ followers and pleased Max Weber and Karl Marx.4 
 Published interpretations of this accumulating body of monographs in area studies has 
led to ideologically driven debates between Eurocentric, Sinocentric and Indocentric 
historians concerned either to reassert or to undermine all canonical narratives about the 
rise of the West. Perhaps the Divergence Debate will fade away if and when surveys appear 
                                                          
1 Vries, Escaping Poverty, The Origins of Modern Economic Growth; Morris, The Measure of Civilization, contain 
awesome bibliographies. 
2 Manning, Navigating World History. 
3 Bagchi, Perilous Passage; Falola and Brownwell, Africa, Empire and Globalization. 
4 Sogner, Making Sense of Global History; Mazlish and Buultjens, Conceptualizing Global History. 
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from Chinese, Indian, Japanese, African, Arab, Latin American and other scholars of world 
history from universities outside the West.5 Meanwhile, a virtually unmanageable volume of 
modern research has at least severely qualified traditional and simplistic Weberian, Smithian 
and Marxist perceptions that only Europe and its settlements overseas had ever developed 
institutions and beliefs approximating to the political, legal, cultural and religious conditions 
required for the formation of markets, and a process of Smithian growth centuries before 
other continents.6 As Marshall Hodgson observed decades ago: ‘All attempts to invoke pre-
modern seminal traits in the occident can be shown to fail under close historical analysis’.7  
 Braudel, Chaudhuri, Goody, Frank, Wong, Marks, Pomeranz, Goldstone, Hobson, 
Parthasarathi and other global economic historians whose names and books are also on the 
recent and comprehensive bibliography constructed by Vries would agree.8 Jones continues 
to revise and reformulate some of the positions he adopted in the first edition of The 
European Miracle in 1981. 9  From his illuminating comparisons of levels and types of 
development achieved by Europe and Asia in the early modern period, Fernand Braudel 
inferred that ‘the populated regions of the world faced with demands of numbers seems to us 
to be quite close to each other’. But there is, he continued, ‘a historiographical inequality 
between Europe and the rest of the world. Europe invented historians and made good use of 
them. Her own history is well lit and can be called as evidence or used as claim. The history 
of non-Europe is still being written. And until the balance of knowledge and interpretation has 
been resorted the historian will be reluctant to cut the Gordian knot of world history.’10 
 Braudel was surely wise to postpone attempts to construct explanations for the 
bifurcation in productivities and living standards between Europe and Asia, (discernible 
                                                          
5 Iggers and Wang, A Global History of Modern Historiography. 
6 Pomeranz, ‘Without Coal and Colonies?’; Acemoglu, Why Nations Fail. 
7 Hodgson, Rethinking World History, p. 86. 
8 Vries, Escaping Poverty. 
9 Jones, Growth Recurring.. 
10 Braudel, ‘Civilization and Capitalism’, vol. 1, p. 134. 
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sometime before 1800, transparent by 1900 and stark in our own times), if only because the 
research required to measure and date economic outcomes for divergence across advanced 
and backward regions of Eurasia for, say, the five centuries before the latter half of the 
nineteenth century remains at a preliminary stage and might alas turn out to be impossible to 
achieve?11 
 Meanwhile, samples of relevant, but partial, data which refer to levels of urbanization, 
balances of commodity trade, life expectancies, heights and calorific consumption levels for 
specific locations (usually large towns) in East, South and South East Asia as well as the 
Ottoman Empire, qualify traditional views that average standards of living afforded by the 
economies of Western Europe for majorities of their populations were discernibly superior 
before the age of revolutions (1756-1815).12 Clearly the deployment of quantitative evidence 
for purposes of transcontinental comparisons is both necessary and complex because 
throughout the centuries before that period Asia (including West Asia) contained larger, but 
difficult to measure, shares of Eurasia’s cultivable land, resources, income, workforces and 
populations.13 Unfortunately almost all the data collected and potentially available on most 
aspects of the economies ruled by the imperial regimes of early modern Asia remains 
sparse, insecure and difficult to interpret. 
 For Europe a voluminous literature in comparative economic history designed to explore 
the origins of relative levels of productivity achieved by nations, regions, towns and villages 
of that continent depends upon a framework of analysis and statistical indicators derived 
from economics which helps historians to specify and to estimate how average incomes, real 
wages and labour productivities have evolved through time. For Britain, Holland, Iberia, 
Sweden and France several indicators go back (as political arithmetic) to the late 
                                                          
11 Deng and O’Brien, ‘Clarifying Data for Reciprocal Comparisons of Nutritional Standards of Living in England 
and the Yangtze Delta (Jiangnan), c.1644 – c.1840’. 
12 Allen, Living Standards in the Past; Baten, ‘Evaluation of Living Standards and Human Capital in China in the 
18-20th century’. 
13 Maddison, World Economy; Frank, Re-Orient. 
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seventeenth century.14 Official statistical investigations to track the growth and fluctuations of 
a wider range of non-Western economies, and for the world economy as a whole, first came 
on stream during the Great Depression.15 A sustained institutional commitment to economic 
measurement on a global scale has, however, only matured under the auspices of the 
United Nations and its subsidiary organizations (particularly the OECD and the World Bank) 
over the last fifty years.16 That programme has stimulated a group of assiduous statisticians 
to try to extend backwards through time the impressive base of data available for recent 
years to compare and to track long-run developments in the wealth and poverty of all 
nations. Most of them (recognizing the pioneering work of Simon Kuznets as a ‘paradigm’ for 
their work) have endeavoured to make serious contributions to a body of salient economic 
facts and placed some more or less plausible estimates at our disposal.17 Statistically based 
exercises, concerned to measure GDP per capita, real wages, consumption standards, 
heights, health and mortality as well as the productivities of land and labour for samples of 
populations and workforces located in particular regions of India, China, Japan and South 
East Asia are beginning to widen the database at the disposal of social scientists who wish 
to conduct systematic and quantified comparisons into the standards of living offered by 
Asian as well as European economies to their populations over pre-modern centuries before 
the Industrial Revolution.18 
 Nevertheless, as it stands, the base of reliable economic data is pretty well truncated in 
its chronological coverage to the twentieth century. Even that limited statistical evidence has 
allowed far more scope for comparative analysis of development among currently affluent 
European, North American and Australasian societies than it does for long-run historical 
comparisons across Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas. Although Japan is now in the 
                                                          
14 Broadberry and O’Rourke, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe, Vol. 1. 
15 Bairoch, Economic Development of the Third World since 1900. 
16 Maddison, World Economy. 
17 Amsden, The Rise of the Rest; Fogel, Political Arithmetic and the Empirical Tradition in Economics. 
18 Federico, Feeding the World; Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers. 
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frame and the situation is improving, a paucity of data continues to handicap academics who 
lack any clear sense of when divergences both in productivities and related standards of 
living between European and Asian economies clearly emerged. 19  Yet, most believe 
(correctly) that an accepted chronology is a precondition for the analysis of why path 
dependant intercontinental differences in economic efficiency and social welfare had 
become discernible by the eighteenth century and indisputably transparent by 1900.  
Meanwhile, an early modern world of ‘surprising economic resemblances’ has been exposed 
in a book by Pomeranz.20 That famous book and the debate it stimulated has called into 
question the unsubstantiated and unquantified assertions that the political, institutional and 
cultural frameworks (as well as modes of production) within which economic activities in Asia 
were embedded for centuries before the Industrial Revolution, differed from Europe in ways 
that clearly and significantly impeded the evolution and integration of commodity and factor 
markets, the development of financial intermediation, the spread of private property rights, 
the operation of mercantile networks, proto industrialization, the commercialization of 
agriculture and patterns of differentiated consumption.21  
 Although contrary representations (derived from canonical accounts by Smith, Marx and 
Weber) of European economies moving gradually, but inexorably ahead for centuries on 
path dependant trajectories operating only within the Western promontory of the Eurasian 
landmass, continue to be published, they now look less and less tenable. 22  Most 
protagonists participating in debates on the Great Divergence recognize, however, that the 
base of statistical evidence available for systematic comparisons of standards of living 
across the economies of Eurasia remains in serious need of extension, repair and validation. 
Most historians, but not all economists, are convinced, however, that prospects for the 
                                                          
19 Williamson, Trade and Poverty. 
20 Pomeranz, Great Divergence. 
21 Vide Special Issues of Journal of Asian Studies, 61, 2002; Canadian Journal of Sociology, 31, 2006; and 
Historically Speaking, September, 2011. 
22 Duschesne, Uniqueness of Western Civilization. 
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construction of plausible conjectures for levels of GDP per capita for China, India and the 
Ottoman empire are entirely remote.23  
 Led and stimulated by the pioneering research of Robert Allen and Jan Luiten Van 
Zanden, a research programme and bibliography of publications testifies to an expectation 
that this task could be most expeditiously and reliably accomplished by collecting, validating 
and comparing data for nominal money, wages with indices that measure the costs of 
foodstuffs, clothing and other basic necessities, purchased by wage dependant labourers for 
their families resident in Eurasian towns for ‘clusters’ of bench-mark years between 1600-
1650, 1650-1700, 1700-1750, 1750-1800, 1800-1850.24 
 For the West, methodological and inferential problems involved in the collection, 
validation, calibration and comparison of data for levels of ‘real’ wages per day received by 
labourers and craftsmen performing comparable tasks, largely in urban but also in agrarian 
contexts have been thoroughly discussed at theoretical and empirical levels.25 For example, 
the bibliography for exercises comparing real wages through time and across space for 
waged workers employed in Europe’s towns and agricultures, is extensive and entirely 
familiar to labour economists, as well as economic and social historians. It forms a, if not the, 
core statistical component of debates in national and European economic history concerned 
with long term and cross-country changes in standards of living afforded to their populations 
by Europe’s regional and national economies.26 Unfortunately, as we will now endeavour to 
show, the quantitative evidence available for labour working in Asian towns and villages is 
                                                          
23 Broadberry, Accounting for the Great Diverge. 
24 Van Zanden, ‘Wages and Standards of Living in Europe’; Allen, ‘The Great Divergence in European Wages 
and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War’. 
25 Scholliers, ‘Real Wages in 19th and 20th Century Europe’; Scholliers and Schwartz, Experiencing Wages, 
Social and Cultural Aspects of Wage Forms in Europe since 1500. 
26 Allen, ‘Real Wage (Historical Trends)’.  
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neither comparable in scale and scope, nor anything but complex and problematical to 
convert into numbers that could facilitate comparisons across Eurasia.27 
 Thus, several caveats familiar to historians who have engaged with complexities of 
drawing inferences from the more extensive transparent and secure data available from 
comparisons of real wage levels across the economies of premodern Europe should, 
therefore, preface the process of validating the disappointing evidence that has been 
published, not only for China but probably for Japan, India and the Ottoman Empire as 
well.28  
 First and foremost is the fact that data on Asian daily wage rates uncovered for these 
centuries refers to significantly lower proportions of the workforce than was the case for 
Europe - particularly England and the Netherlands where transitions to dependence on 
wages for the incomes and expenditures of family units had proceeded further and faster 
than elsewhere in the West and the East. 29  For example, most of the ratios of wage 
dependant workers to the total workforce published by economic historians of the Chinese 
empire and republic are in the 5% range. Even for a port city, like Tianjin that ratio was only 
12.4%. 30  According to an occupational survey for 1919 for Jiangsu Province (a highly 
commercialized region of the Yangtze Delta), skilled and unskilled waged workers accounted 
for just 5% of all occupations. Even Marxist historians participating in debates concerned 
with ‘the sprouts of capitalism’ recognized that a Chinese proletariat took a long time to 
emerge.31  
                                                          
27 Allen, Living Standards in the Past. 
28 Bassino and Ma, ‘Japanese Unskilled Wages’; Ozmucur and Pamuk, ‘Real Wages and Standards of Living in 
the Ottoman Empire’; Allen, ‘India in the Great Divergence’. 
29  Lucassen, ‘The Rise, Organization and Institutional Framework of Factor Markets, Proletarianization in 
Western Europe and India’. 
30 Li et al, Mingqing Shidaide Nongye Cibenzhuyi Mengya Wenti, pp. 335-6. 
31 Liu, ‘Jiawu Zhanzhenghou Zhiyoude Zibenzhuyide Nongye Guyong Laodongde Fazhan’. 
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 Runs of records uncovered (for both continents, but particularly for the East) refer to a 
limited range of occupations, dominated by unskilled jobs in agriculture and urban 
construction, supplemented by a range of more confined references to wage rates for skilled 
occupations – again dominated by craftsmen employed in urban building industries. 
 Thirdly, the framework of institutions surrounding Asian labour markets and the terms of 
the contracts or conventions for the employment of waged labour are very difficult to clarify, 
particularly for those involving wages paid by governmental authorities who often recruited 
labour to work on building sites and industrial workshops on terms that approximated to 
corvée. States also remunerated them with unknown and variable proportions of payments 
in kind (called gongshi 工食, which included food, clothing, shelter, etc.) supplemented by 
politically decreed sums of money (gongjia 工价), which was only a part of the ‘living 
wage’. 32 As Peng’s data show that payments in kind for rural waged workers remained 
substantial:33  
 
Period Payment in food Payment in cash  
1573–1619 81.6% 18.4% 
1628–1644 86.5% 13.5% 
1861–1874 71.0% 29.0% 
1875–1908 67.5% 32.5% 
Average 76.6% 23.4% 
 
Furthermore, the same pattern characterised payments for urban workers’ payments in the 
Lower Yangtze during the late Qing:34 
                                                          
32 Peng, ‘Qingdai Qianqi Jiangnan Zhizaode Yanjiu’, pp. 105, 108; also, Campbell, and Lee, ‘Free and Unfree 
Labor in Qing China’; Li et al, Mingqing Shidaide Nongye Cibenzhuyi Mengya Wenti, pp. 167, 230-42, 438-41, 
496-9; Liu, ‘Jiawu Zhanzhenghou Zhiyoude Zibenzhuyide Nongye Guyong Laodongde Fazhan’, p. 29.. 
33 Li et al, Mingqing Shidaide Nongye Cibenzhuyi Mengya Wenti, pp. 365, 366, 440, 441. 
34 Peng, ‘Qingdai Qianqi Jiangnan Zhizaode Yanjiu’, pp. 97, 107. 
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Workers’ type Payment in food Payment in cash 
Unskilled (1) 67% 33% 
Unskilled (2) 75% 25% 
Semi-skilled 67% 33% 
Skilled (1) 33% 67% 
Skilled (2) 43% 57% 
Average 57% 43% 
 
 Furthermore money wage rates are often recorded formally in China, in an officially 
designated numeraire or unit of account (the silver tael) convertible into ‘ready cash’ at 
purchasing power parities that were subject to considerable degrees of variance from locality 
to locality and time to time.35  
 Other and far more limited Asian sources for daily wage rates cited in judicial and 
company records that refer to employment in sectors, firms and occupations in the private 
sector are either under-specified or collected from the archives of foreign multinationals that 
paid high and seasonal wages to Chinese workers servicing ships for the weeks that they 
remained in port.36 Often the evidence for wages refers to payments to landless unmarried 
males and females working with and for their own kin.  
 Last but not least, the procedures used to convert evidence for daily wage rates into 
annual family incomes depend upon guesses about the numbers of days worked per annum 
or per season and the supplementary income provided by wives and children.37  
 All of these problems have seriously compromised the deployment of wage rates as 
proxies for labour productivities and as a statistical basis for the construction of modal family 
                                                          
35  Kishimoto, Shindai, Chūgoku, Nobukka to Reoizai hendō; Theobald, War Finance and Logistics in Late 
Imperial China, p. 26. 
36 Van Dyke, Canton Trade. 
37 Allen, ‘Agricultural Productivity and Rural Incomes and the Yangtze Delta’. 
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incomes received by unskilled and skilled workers across Asia. 38 No historian who has 
attempted to grapple with the meagre and ambiguous records for China, India and the 
Ottoman Dominions doubts that Asia’s labour markets for this period cannot be analysed by 
resorting to the neo-classical models and assumptions that have been utilized to support 
chains of inferences based upon accounts recorded by institutions for the daily wage rates 
paid to unskilled and skilled labour in the West.39  
 Recent and commendable attempts to collect and calibrate evidence for nominal daily 
wage rates recorded for Chinese workers employed by the imperial state and by private 
firms illustrates the complexities involved and exposes the heroic, but contestable, 
assumptions necessary for the construction of numbers that could potentially be compared 
with the more voluminous and less ambiguous data for Europe.40  
 Thus we commend the stimulus that Broadberry and Gupta’s pioneering attempts 
imparted to ongoing programmes for quantification to collect and calibrate wage data for pre-
modern China and India.41 They would, however, almost certainly recognize that their figures 
published in 2006 for nominal daily wage rates for agricultural labourers employed in the 
Yangtze Delta are based upon two quotations that are not fully specified in either of the 
secondary sources that they cite and cannot stand as a representative for modal wage rates 
for unskilled Chinese manpower labouring in Jiangnan. 
 Their initiative has been carried forward by an extensive database of nominal wage rates 
collected in large part by Christine Moll-Murata. She uncovered a far larger sample of 
                                                          
38 Booth, ‘Living Standards in the Past’. 
39 For Spanish America, see Dobado-Gonzales and Garcia-Montero, ‘Neither So Low So Short’. 
40 Allen, ‘Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War’; Allen, 
‘Wages, Prices and Living Standards in China, Japan and Europe’. The data for Europe is fully referenced in 
Deng and O’Brien, ‘Clarifying Data for Reciprocal Comparisons of Nutritional Standards of Living in 
England and the Yangtze Delta (Jiangnan).’ 
41 Broadberry and Gupta, ‘Early Modern Great Divergence’; Deng and O’Brien, ‘Clarifying Data for Reciprocal 
Comparisons of Nutritional Standards of Living in England, and the Yangtze Delta (Jiangnan)’. 
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references to nominal money wage data recorded in primary sources for China that refers 
mainly to skilled and unskilled workers employed by the state as well as a smaller range of 
observations that serves as a sample of workers employed by private firms. For reasons that 
are not elaborated only a selection of the official sources recording nominal wage rates were 
utilized by five authors of a working paper that utilized these data to construct a leading 
article ‘Wages, Prices and Living Standards in China, 1738-1925 in Comparison with 
Europe, Japan and India’’ for a special issue of the Economic History Review on Asia in the 
Great Divergence published in 2011. 42  Presumably government sources containing the 
unutilized data placed on the web were rejected by the authors of this seminal paper for 
several good reasons: For example, they recognized that the primary sources were undated; 
referred to a single prefecture; cited a common wage for a wide range of skills; displayed a 
wage scale for eighteen provinces in1816 suggesting that unskilled labour was remunerated 
at the same wage across the empire; indicated a stable wage rate for building workers 
employed in the Yuanmingyuan Park between 1723-36 down to 1860; included figures for 
monthly wages that omitted an unknown amount of payments in kind for ‘families’; exposed 
an inexplicable decline of around 90% in the piece rate offered to one category of skilled 
labour in the printing industry between1705 and 1851-61 etc., etc.43  
 On close examination most of Qing China’s official sources consulted by Moll-Murata for 
the Special Issue and reviewed here by us contain data on nominal wage rates that turned 
out to be too difficult to validate and too complex to interpret. Yet, several of the official 
sources that were by default utilized by the authors also remain ambiguous. They do not, in 
our view, seem fit for the purpose of comparing levels of real income derived from wages 
across Eurasia.44 Nevertheless, the authors opted to merge figures from the following official 
and private sources in order to construct a database for nominal daily wage rates and, by 
                                                          
42 Broadberry and Hindle, ‘Asia in the Great Divergence’. 
43 See Footnote 44 below and after calibration, for estimates of annual earnings, see Allen et al, ‘Wages, Prices 
and Living Standards in China 1738-1925 in comparison with Europe, Japan and India’. 
44 The complete data set compiled by Moll-Murata, ‘The Wage Data in Da Qing Huidian Shili’. 
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selection interpolation and calibration, for estimates of annual earnings for unskilled 
labourers employed in three major Chinese cities - Beijing, Suzhou and Canton between 
1740 and 1820.45 Primary sources for their database included:  
 
(a) An Imperial record for 1769 which refers to daily wage rates payable for just over 900 
skilled and unskilled workers employed on 945 governmental construction sites 
across the Qing empire, supplemented by a smaller set of wage rates fixed by the 
State for employees in its armament factories in 1813;46 
(b) 63 quotations of daily wages from the accounts of the Dutch East India Company 
paid to labourers to load and repair its ships docked in Canton over the eighteenth 
century;47 
(c) 188 underspecified quotations culled from testimonies contained in the Qing judicial 
records for c. 1740-1820;48 
(d) 6 piece rates negotiated with a gild representing semi-skilled workers converted to 
daily rates for cotton manufacturing in Suzhou for 1693,1701, 1715, 1730, 1772 and 
1795;49 
(e) Daily money wages paid to unskilled labour employed by just one fuel store outside 
Beijing for the years 1807-20 extended for the ongoing period of accelerated 
divergence 1820-1914.50  
 
 Although this foray into Chinese wage data is an entirely welcome contribution to the 
meagre base of statistical evidence available for the economic history of Qing China, for 
                                                          
45 Allen et al, ‘Wages, Prices and Living Standards’. 
46 http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/ans/project/shp/zeli.zonglue.htm. 
47 Van Dyke, Canton Trade. 
48 Broadberry and Hindle, ‘Asia in the Great Divergence’, p. 14. 
49 Ibid., pp. 10 and 34. 
50 Ibid., pp. 34-5. 
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purposes of locating a chronology for the divergence debate we find it necessary to clarify 
the nature and to assess the quality of the meagre and imperfect sources for nominal wage 
rates the authors uncovered for the period that preceded divergence with the West. 
 To that end the most geographically extensive and data-rich primary sources utilized by 
the authors and placed on web sites (cited in footnotes 12 and 21 of their article) are Qing 
records listing figures for ‘government regulated’ money wages for workers employed on 
public construction sites in 1769 as well as 1723, 1736 and the smaller sample for 
employees in military factories in 1813. Records were located for 15 provinces and 945 
districts (prefectures/counties) of China. The nominal wage data presented in Table 1 of the 
article has been calibrated from over 2000 figures for wage rates for master artisans 
(translated into skilled labour) and labourers (translated into unskilled labour).  
 As published the calculations refer to mean nominal wage rates payable within the 
boundaries of districts. District-wide averages were then converted to means for the number 
of districts contained in 21 provinces or regions of China. Thus the raw data has been 
transformed into ‘representative’ daily wage rates for 21 regions/provinces that in 1776 
included 73% of the empire’s population. As constructed the regional averages were not, 
however, weighted by a region’s share of China’s total population which varied from 1 million 
for Manchuria to around 30 million for Jiangsu province in the Yangtze Delta.51  
 Furthermore, variance around the means calibrated for districts, prefectures and 
provinces (18 of them) is not indicated. Although a scrutiny of the raw data on web sites 
cited in footnotes will reveal that intra-regional and cross-regional differentials for wage rates 
for the same occupations could be significant and very wide apart.52 We suggest that the 
meaning and provenance of these regional and imperial averages set out in Table 1 is 
insecure. Furthermore, and as calculated, the wage rates for unskilled labour in that table 
‘look’ closer to 0.04 taels of silver per day than the higher figures of 0.09 to 0.10 taels 
                                                          
51 Ibid., pp.11-13. 
52 Ibid., p.14, fns 20 and 21. 
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favoured by the authors when they settled upon, simply selected and interpreted as outer 
bound estimates for daily wages paid to labourers employed in Beijing, Suzhou and 
Canton.53  
 Over the decade 1765-74 a daily wage rate of 0.04 taels of silver would purchase 1.9 kg 
of second grade white rice at a seasonally low autumn price in the Yangtze Delta.54 That 
quantity of edible grain translates into 1710 kilocalories of nutrients per capita for a family of 
four persons and 1368 kilocalories for a family of five. Both levels fall below the 2100 
kilocalories proscribed by the FAO for food security. 55 In short, China’s primary sources 
recording recommended daily wage rates for unskilled labour employed by the Qing state 
almost certainly record ‘norms’ for monetary payments that were, in all probability, net of the 
food, shelter, clothing and other wage payments in kind that were managed and supplied by 
departments other than the Ministry of Revenue which was responsible for transfers as 
monetary salaries and wages to bureaucrats and soldiers as well as workers employed by 
the Qing state.56 Our reading of the primary sources derives plausibility from the stability and 
constancy of the wage norms across space and time published in the official sources 
consulted by the authors.57 Prima facie, the Chinese state preferred to deal with problems 
arising from rising and fluctuating prices for food and other necessities required by and for its 
own employees by purchasing and supplying them with food and other wage goods (gongshi 
工食).58 There seems to be no reason to accept the authors’ claim that the evidence that 
                                                          
53 Ibid., Table 1. 
54 Yu, Zhongguo Jiage Shi, pp. 900, 904; Huang, Zhongguo Lidai Wujia Wenti Kaoshu, pp. 330–9. 
55 F.A.O. 2002, ‘Food Energy – Methods of Analysis and Conversion Factors’. 
56 Peng, Zhongguo Jindai Shougongyeshi Ziliao, pp. 396–413, Peng, ‘Qingdai Qianqi Jiangnan Zhizaode Yanjiu’, 
pp. 97, 101, 107, Zhao et al, Zhongguo Junshi Shi, vol. 3, p. 459; He and Wei, Huangchao Jingshi Wenbian, p. 
868. 
57 Broadberry and Hindle, ‘Asia in the Great Divergence’, pp.11-14. 
58 Li et al, Mingqing Shidaide Nongye Cibenzhuyi Mengya Wenti. 
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they uncovered for wage norms were ‘nearer to the market than any previous regulations by 
the central government’.59  
 Laudably they endeavoured to ascertain ‘how accurately’ wages ‘recommended’ by the 
imperial state approximated to wages offered by the private sector of the economy ‘by 
juxtaposing them’ against a broader dataset of 264 scattered wage quotations from many 
private sources from different parts of China. Nevertheless, a scrutiny of this evidence does 
not inspire confidence that such different types of wage data could be ‘pooled’ to form a 
secure database for purposes for comparisons with the evidence for market –determined 
wages for Western Europe negotiated in contexts that approximated to proto-labour 
markets.60  
 Indeed and with candour and transparency, the authors admit that the entire set of wage 
data they have assiduously collected and which refer to both the public and private sectors 
of the Chinese economy may not be fit for that purpose? As they observe the data displays a 
‘general lack of comparability due to the multiplicity of labour contracts, payment systems 
and currency units. Employment contracts could last for a day, a month or a year and careful 
attention must be given to the number of days worked in a month or year to reduce the 
payment information to a consistent daily rate. There are many cases for which food 
allowances were mandatorily given in addition to cash payments. Possibly the most difficult 
issue of all is the quotation of wages in different currency units (copper coins, silver taels) 
with exchange values that were both highly localized and fluctuating over time’. They 
concluded ‘studies not taking full cognizance of these problems can be very misleading’.61  
 An older generation of economic historians who also encountered and debated this 
particular and ‘most difficult of all issues’ in their endeavours to convert more abundant and 
transparent evidence for Europe’s urban wage rates into a common numeraire such as 
grams of gold or silver might well conclude that the complexities embodied in the pre-
                                                          
59 Broadberry and Hindle, ‘Asia in the Great Divergence’, p.11, fn 12. 
60 Van der Linden and Lucassen, ‘Prolegomena for a Global Labour History’. 
61 Broadberry and Hindle, ‘Asia in the Great Divergence’, p. 13. 
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modern Chinese monetary system could well be insurmountable.62 The presence of this 
barrier to quantification has been attributed by monetary historians of China to the 
persistence of the empire’s traditional and virtually unregulated monetary system based 
upon silver and copper that operated with high transaction costs for both market exchanges, 
and to some degree for taxation.63 
 Silver utilized for transactions by and with the state and for wholesale trade served the 
empire as a unit of account and store of value, but not as a currency minted into coins of a 
standardized and officially sanctioned denomination, weight or finesse. 64  As a precious 
metal it functioned basically as a numeraire. Its purchasing power depended, moreover, 
upon several attributes embodied in the size and form in which it was offered in payment for 
commodities, services and the settlement of debts. For example, in its most convenient and 
reliable form, namely, as imported foreign coins (particularly Mexican dollars) silver 
commanded a premium of up to 25% over bars, ingots and fragments of the precious 
metal.65 Even the familiar silver ingot (the ‘sycee’ or ‘shoe’) varied in weight and finesse from 
place to place because assayers cast the metal into ingots of various sizes and finesse in 
accordance with customers’ needs and with local conventions and preferences.66 Silver-
hoarding was institutionalised.67 Interesting evidence from Évariste Régis Huc (1813–1860), 
a French missionary Catholic priest who famously travelled across 11 provinces of the Qing 
Empire in 1841-46, suggests that during the mid-19th century daily transactions in China 
Proper were conducted with copper cash and, to less extent, silver bullion (instead of 
                                                          
62 Scholliers and Zamagni, Labours Reward; Mayhew, ‘Prices in England’. 
63 Peng, A Monetary History of China; Von Glahn, Fountains of Fortune. 
64 Deng, ‘Miracle or Mirage? Foreign Silver, China’s Economy and Globalisation of the Sixteenth to Nineteenth 
Centuries’. 
65 Irigoin, ‘A Trojan Horse in Daoguang China?’ pp. 8-11. 
66 Kuroda, ‘Anonymous Currencies or Named Debts, Local Credits and Units of Account’, pp. 57-80. 
67 Chen and Liu, ‘Gongfu Shichang Yu Wuzhi Shenghuo’. 
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Spanish/Mexican coins); the only region where silver coins were in routine use was Tibet.68 
This explains why a classic account of the Chinese monetary system concluded ‘only 
examination of the local system at a particular time can determine the basis of the 
standard’.69 Predictably, dealers in money emerged in every corner of the empire.70 
 Thus, citations of nominal wage rates in primary sources in silver taels (and even in 
copper cash) need careful validation. References to nominal wages in silver taels can only 
be transformed into real wages as the product of conversions from or into copper cash – 
which remained until the twentieth century, the dominant medium of exchange utilized by 
wage dependant workers and their families for the purchase of commodities.71  
 Furthermore, most retail and an unknown proportion of wholesale transactions were 
conducted with coins (wen) made largely of copper minted by 50 provincial but official mints. 
These coins were certified but never standardized into a stable imperial set of weights and 
denominations.72 Thus a debt of ‘1000 might be paid in 1000 good copper coins … whereas 
a food shop might expect only 780 coins of inferior quality’.73 Coins were cast in different 
ways, denominations and copper content at provincial mints at different times. Their quality, 
acceptability and purchasing power nominally regulated by the imperial state varied 
significantly across space and time.74  
 Literally strung together into units of higher denomination of 1000, 625 and 500 coins 
and assayed by private money dealers, copper coins embodied vintage as well as scale 
                                                          
68 Huc, Souvenirs d'un voyage dans la Tartarie, le Thibet. 
69 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, p. 46. 
70  ‘Miracle or Mirage? Foreign Silver, China’s Economy and Globalisation of the Sixteenth to Nineteenth 
Centuries’. 
71 Kuroda, ‘Copper Coins Chosen and Silver Differentiated’; Kuroda, ‘Anonymous Currencies or Named Debts, 
Local Credits and Units of Account’. 
72 Von Glahn, Fountains of Fortune. 
73 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, p. 46. 
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effects.75 Thus strings of coins minted under dynasties before the Qing exchanged at a 
significant premium over current and more recently minted coins. Good old copper coins 
even operated as stores of value and circulated over more extended spaces and markets.76 
Counterfeiting remained rife and virtually uncontrollable so that monetized transactions and 
purchases in imperial China operated with several grades of official, illegal and imperfectly 
arbitraged copper coins along with privately assayed and heterogeneous liangs or taels of 
silver ingots and foreign coins.77  
 In short, the empire’s monetary ‘systems’ remained virtually unregulated and the 
ostensibly low levels of efficiency at which they operated depended upon a plethora of 
private financial intermediaries dealing in a variety of silver taels and foreign coins as well as 
a multiplicity of good, inferior and counterfeit copper cash that majorities of the populations 
(including wage earners) of the Ming and Qing empire utilized to purchase goods and 
services. Taels retained their function as stores of value for intra-imperial and foreign trade 
for the settlement of debts and for transactions at officially decreed rates of exchange within 
and without the state.78 Nevertheless, as a leading expert on the Qing monetary system and 
policy concluded, ‘in China … every monetary transaction was to an extent an exchange 
transaction.’79  
 The authors of this leading article certainly recognized the problems involved in 
converting money wage rates cited in official documents as silver taels into copper cash or 
wen and resorted to a collection of exchange rates collected by Vogel.80 Unfortunately the 
data in Vogel’s scholarly article is geographically confined to the hinterland around Beijing 
                                                          
75 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, pp. 53-60. 
76 Kuroda, ‘Copper Coins Chosen and Silver Differentiated’. 
77 Lin, ‘Jiadao Qianjian Xianxiang Chansheng Yuanyin’; Kuroda, ‘Anonymous Currencies or Named Debts, Local 
Credits and Units of Account’. 
78 Chen, ‘Flexible Bimetallic Exchange Rates in China’. 
79 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, p. 46; and vide Wong, ‘Evolution of the Chinese Monetary System’. 
80 Vogel, ‘Chinese Central Monetary Policy’. 
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and to data sets for official exchange rates between a silver tael of 37.5 grams of silver and 
copper cash which display considerable variations across the provinces of China.81  
 Furthermore bimetallic ratios between copper and silver on the one hand and between 
silver and copper with rice on the other that Vogel also published display high degrees of 
variance through time and across space.82 It is our view that no record for intra-imperial 
exchange rates that could avoid the ambiguities attached to the purchasing power of wages 
cited as payments in silver taels or copper cash has been published.83  
 Even if barriers to quantification posed by the Qing monetary system could be 
circumvented fastidious historians with their commitments to a disciplined validation of 
contexts and sources may continue to maintain that most of the evidence (particularly for the 
states recommended wage scales documented in official sources) uncovered in this 
preliminary research into nominal rates paid to the pre-modern workforce of China is not yet 
transparent, accurate or extensive enough to help with the problem of locating the origins, 
onset and progression of economic divergence between the Occident and Orient. 
 Our stance of scepticism can, moreover, be supported from a scrutiny of the larger 
database from which the authors selected 327 disparate observations (clustered between 
the 1740s and 1800s) which they ‘pooled’ in order to estimate a ‘wage regression for 
eighteenth century China’.84 We have supplemented and compared their evidence with our 
own smaller data set of nominal wage rates collected from other primary sources and from a 
selection of sources books and articles published by Chinese economic historians with 
recognized expertize on that empire’s labour markets.85 
                                                          
81 Yu, Zhongguo Jiage Shi. 
82 Vogel, ‘Chinese Central Monetary Policy’. 
83 Broadberry and Hindle, ‘Asia in the Great Divergence’, p.13, fn. 16. 
84 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
85 Liu, ‘Jiawu Zhanzhenghou Zhiyoude Zibenzhuyide Nongye Guyong Laodongde Fazhan’; Liu et al, ‘A Sample 
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 Nominal wage rates have long been recognized as the most intractable source of 
evidence for the measurement of productivity and standards of living for European economic 
history. 86  For China’s far less extensive integrated and competitive labour markets, the 
information required to standardize observations for nominal wage rates into plausible 
estimates for the annual earnings of wage dependent proletarians is rarely recorded or 
clarified by the primary sources.87 
 Having scrutinized the primary sources cited in footnotes to this heuristic voyage of 
discovery into the evidence available for Chinese wage rates, consulted the secondary 
literature on the empire’s labour markets and constructed our own smaller sample of nominal 
wage rates for unskilled labour, we wish to make a number of critical but hopefully helpful 
observations on the calibrations offered in this useful but exploratory contribution to the 
economic history of Qing China. 
 First, Chinese primary sources uncovered so far provide entirely limited information on 
payments in kind (food, shelter, clothing, tools etc.). The assumption that if the source made 
no mention of such payments then none occurred is as the secondary literature on labour 
markets and waged labour suggests insecure, particularly for labourers employed on remote 
construction sites and for annual contracts in agriculture. Our own and other perceptions 
from historians who have published on Chinese labour markets suggest that nominal wage 
rates recorded on a monthly and annual basis are for contracts where persistently high 
proportions of total annual earnings consisted of payments in kind.88 
 Such payments were, moreover, a feature of all pre-modern wage systems and 
alleviated risks associated with fluctuations in food prices and the difficulties of securing 
                                                          
86 Munro, ‘Money and Coinage’. 
87  For sustained endeavours to analyse European wage data consult Munro’s website: 
www.economics.toronto.ca. 
88  Li et al, Mingqing Shidaide Nongye Cibenzhuyi Mengya Wenti; Liu, ‘1600-1840 Nian Zhongguo Guonei 
Shengchan Zongzhide Gusuan’. 
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currency in the forms and denominations required to remunerate labour. 89 Many 
observations in the primary sources for China that specify nominal wage rates that fell and/or 
moved below the levels required to purchase subsistence at local prices could only, we 
suggest, refer to government contracts for employment that included food and other 
supplementary payments. Otherwise the Confucian state was not paying living wages either 
to the soldiers or to unskilled labourers and their families that it employed.90 
 Thirdly, and given that the primary sources provide clear evidence for a skill premium 
both for the wage norms specified by the state and nominal wage rates offered by private 
firms, the pooling or conflation of observations for skilled and unskilled labour imparts an 
upward bias to data that we wish to reconfigure and mobilize for comparisons with the real 
wages received by unskilled workers in the West. 
 Fourthly, Chinese sources refer to annual, monthly, weekly and daily wage rates, but 
supply virtually no information on the number of days or hours worked, which is required in 
order to generate estimates for annual earnings. For reasons that are not elaborated, the 
authors converted observations for nominal wage rates expressed on a monthly or annual 
basis into daily rates on the puzzling assumption that these observations referred to fifteen 
days a month and sixty days a year?91 
 Fifthly, as we have already noted considerable ambiguities and uncertainties surround 
the meaning and validity of most of the observations for nominal wage rates recovered from 
governmental sources. Their stability over long periods of time and limited variation across 
space leaves an impression that these records are often analogous to pay scales 
promulgated by the Qing state for the remuneration of soldiers and bureaucrats. Such scales 
normally included pay plus cost of living allowances. 92  They embody only a tenuous 
                                                          
89  Lucassen, ‘The Rise, Organization and Institutional Framework of Factor Markets, Proletarianization in 
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90 He and Wei, Huangchao Jingshi Wenbian. 
91 Broadberry and Hindle, ‘Asia in the Great Divergence’, p.14, fn 20. 
92 He and Wei, Huangchao Jingshi Wenbian. 
23 
 
resemblance to the daily wage rates generated by contexts approximating to markets in 
Western Europe.93 Furthermore, and as our comparison with the price of edible rice reveals 
too many of the observations derived from state sources and pooled for purposes of a 
regression exercise would not have provided unskilled labour working for the state with a 
living wage (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Rice Prices, 1641-1850 (tael/picul) 
Year 
China’s 
average Shanghai Suzhou Xiaoshan 
1641-45 1.23 3.28   
1646-50 1.23 2.82   
1651-55 1.17 2.98   
1656-60 1.17 1.50   
1661-65 0.83 1.25   
1666-70 0.83 0.67   
1671-75 0.63 0.86   
1676-80 0.63 1.32   
1681-85 0.84 0.98  0.88 
1686-90 0.84 0.96  0.98 
1691-95 0.72 0.90  0.87 
1696-1700 0.72  0.82 0.83 
1701-05 0.94  1.04 0.87 
1706-10 0.94  1.28 1.21 
1711-15 0.90  0.9 0.92 
1716-20 0.90  0.86 1.01 
1721-25 0.86  1.06 1.18 
1726-30 0.86  1.16 1.02 
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1731-35 0.97  1.22 1.11 
1736-40 0.97  1.20 0.99 
1741-45 1.11  1.49 1.14 
1746-50 1.11  1.67 1.38 
1751-55 1.59  1.90 1.50 
1756-60 1.59  1.90 1.50 
1761-65 1.67  1.84 1.61 
1766-70 1.67  1.86 1.89 
1771-75 1.48  1.64 1.72 
1776-80 1.48  1.98 1.80 
1781-85 1.56  1.91 2.06 
1786-90 1.56  1.68 2.05 
1791-95 1.91  1.40 2.84 
1796-1800 1.91  1.21 2.37 
1801-05 2.12  2.31 2.61 
1806-10 2.12  2.77  
1811-15 2.09  2.55  
1816-20 2.09  2.37  
1821-25 1.89  2.49  
1826-30 1.89  2.23  
1831-35 2.35  2.64  
1836-40 2.35  2.25  
1845-50 2.19  2.09  
 
Source: Huang, Zhongguo Lidai Wujia Wenti Kaoshu. 
 
 Although the authors prudently discarded much of the wage data collected from several 
official sources they made a questionable strategic decision to simply merge a potentially 
significant share of the observations derived from official records for 1723, 1736, 1769, and 
1813 into a pool of 327 observations for nominal daily wage data clustered in time between 
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1749 and 1820. Most of their ‘scattered wage quotations’ certainly relate to labour employed 
by the private sector and were indeed drawn ‘from many sources and for many parts of 
China’.94 
 Nevertheless and on close inspection it seems that these ostensibly more promising 
figures (not posted on the web) originated in judicial records and first appeared in the 
publications of three Chinese economic historians Peng, Wei and Wu. They are referenced 
but not appraised in the article. We were alerted to the complexities of deriving hard data 
from legal records by Jiang Shoupeng who surveyed copper cash wages for 6100 criminal 
cases recorded in the Qing Xingke Tiben. He noted that the variations in annual earnings 
from agricultural work ranged from 2000 to 6400 wen. For handicrafts they ranged from 
5000-12000 wen.95  
 Furthermore, our own smaller and complementary sample of wage quotations published 
in secondary sources is also based on judicial records. It has been placed on our web site 
and includes a disparate and difficult to standardize range of figures for nominal annual 
wage rates for both skilled and unskilled labour employed mainly in agriculture and in just 
four industries, including coal, charcoal, bricks and bricklaying.96 Our perception is that the 
figures cited for wage rates drawn from legal proceedings display extraordinary degrees of 
variance for comparable occupations over time and across the empire. Contracts and 
contexts for the wage rates by occupation are almost never specified, let alone elaborated in 
legal sources. It is impossible to verify the hours, days, weeks or months worked. Potential 
payments in kind or any other conditions for employment are not specified, and several 
historians including Liu Kexiang and Liu Ruiya are pretty clear that food and other payments 
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in kind dominated contracts for unskilled labour until well into the twentieth century.97 Alas, 
judicial records do not provide the homogeneous and transparent evidence required to 
calculate the incomes received by wage dependent labourers employed in the Qing Empire 
during the centuries preceding and succeeding the great divergence.  
 Our critique of this serious academic endeavour to compare levels of real wages 
between China and Europe and thereby provide statistical underpinnings for a chronology 
for the Great Divergence does not intend to conclude on a negative note. Quantification is 
nothing more than a cumulative process of gathering, reviewing and revising statistical 
evidence until a frontier for consensus and acceptability is reached. Furthermore, the 
methods pioneered by Robert Allen to convert nominal into real wages and real family 
incomes remain innovatory, relevant and entirely heuristic for such purposes of comparison. 
Unfortunately, the data currently available for nominal wage rates paid either by the state or 
as citations from judicial proceedings for Qing times (1644-1911) seems to be neither 
voluminous, transparent nor representative enough to serve as proxies either for average 
daily wages or for the standards of living afforded by the private sector of the Chinese 
economy to a definable group of unskilled urban and agricultural workers at the bottom end 
of an income distribution scale. There may well be nominal wage data in Chinese primary 
sources that could be defended as comparable to the wages paid to far larger proportions of 
European workforces. But the figures uncovered by these preliminary exercises in 
comparisons across Eurasia suggests that secure transparent evidence fit for that purpose 
will be hard to uncover, simply because the contractual, monetary and other conditions 
within which unskilled (and to a lesser extent skilled) labour was employed in both the rural 
and urban sectors of the Qing and other Asian economies exemplifying significant 
differences with the West cumulate into serious impediments to quantification. The 
institutional contexts which framed the returns for work performed by vast majorities of the 
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Chinese and other Asian workforces (including wage labourers) differed to a degree that 
simply frustrated scholarly attempts at meaningful comparisons. 
 Prudentially the authors resisted the temptation to make strong claims based upon 
empire-wide averages derived from such a disparate pool of data that prima facie seems so 
difficult to define, validate and standardize. Instead they opted to calibrate the data at their 
disposal into indices that refer to standards of living offered by the pre-modern and pre-
divergence Chinese economy to wage dependant unskilled labour employed in just three 
large cities, Beijing, Suzhou and Canton. They depicted their numbers as reasonable for a 
substantial part of the population at the relatively low end of the income distribution.98 
 For purposes of comparison with their counterparts employed in European cities the 
figures cited for nominal daily wage rates converted to purchasing power parities and grams 
of fine internationally traded silver are cited below. Their respective weights and qualities are 
derived from a seminal article by Ulrich Vogel. Vogel did not, however, provide the local 
rates of exchange required to capture the multiple purchasing power parity of the coins 
actually spent by Chinese workers and their families:99 
 
(a) 45.6 wen of copper cash as a base line average for the Yangtze Delta; 
(b) 90.0 wen for Suzhou (the commercial capital of that region); 
(c) 89.7 wen for Beijing and 
(d) 83.6 wen for Canton. 
 
 Two primary sources already appraised are cited to support the figures generated by the 
regression for callenders’ wage rates for Suzhou and for dockers’ wage rates for Canton. For 
Canton a range from 30 to 80 is cited in the basic data which refers to short term seasonal 
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rates.100 For Beijing the wage rate predicted by the regression (illustrated in fig. 1of the 
article) derives support from just a single primary source (a private fuel store outside the 
capital city).101 
 The selections for Canton and Suzhou as well as Beijing are, however, justified, quoted 
and utilized for on the grounds that ‘as a bench-marks or comparisons with European urban 
wages in the following sections we chose the optimistic version of 0.08-0.1 taels wage rate 
for the eighteenth century in order to test the revisionists’ claim at its favourable margin.’ 
They also cite a footnote that indicates that seventeenth century nominal wage levels may 
not be far apart from the 18th-19th century.102 
 The procedure of deploying outer bound estimates to test the potential validity of 
hypotheses is certainly heuristic, but needs to be accompanied by some discussion of its 
plausibility in relation to the spectrum of nominal daily wage rates cited and utilized in this 
article. That spectrum ranges from 30 copper cash (the Government decreed ‘norm’ 
monetary payments to unskilled labour working in Fujian in 1769) to around 160 copper cash 
for skilled construction workers employed for work at a palace in Shenyang (in Manchuria) 
between 1723 and 1736 and an imperial villa outside Beijing in 1766.103 
 Our scrutiny of the entire collection of daily wage rates and money wage ‘norms’ 
published by the authors for skilled and unskilled labour for a long eighteenth century (1690s 
to 1820) leaves us, however, with an impression that a majority of the documented figures 
(cited in the text and footnotes to the authors’ article and working paper) that refer to nominal 
daily wage rates and norms for ‘unskilled labour’ look closer to a modal rate of 40-50 copper 
cash per day than their ‘optimistic and outer bound numbers’ they ‘constructed’ and 
‘selected’ for Beijing, Suzhou and Canton of 0.08-0.10 silver taels or 80-100 copper cash 
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generated by a regression, based upon a ‘pool’ of ambiguous data. 104  The impression 
implies that if 0.04 taels are by default recognized and utilized by economic historians as a 
modal or representative nominal daily wage rate for unskilled agricultural and urban labour, 
three negotiable conclusions follow. 
 First (and in contrast to the higher numbers proposed by the authors of this innovatory 
attempt at quantification), it could mean that divergence may have been a stream for more 
than a century before, the period after 1750 favoured by the California School as marking its 
onset. Indeed such data could suggest that the gap between North-western Europe and 
China may have been present and widening already in the 1600s. 
 Secondly, that nominal wage rates combined with Allen’s innovatory methods of 
conversion to real wages afforded by the relatively backward cities of Eastern and Southern 
Europe to their unskilled labourers at the lower ends of income distributions would look 
superior to the real incomes afflicting their counterparts in China and almost certainly in 
India, Japan and the Ottoman Dominions as well.105 
 Our final conclusion (which is shared by an older generation of economic historians with 
recognized expertise on China) is to recommend scepticism towards nominal wage data in 
print for the Chinese empire unless and until future archival research uncovers new and 
more transparent statistics, meanwhile attempts to forge a consensus around validated data 
for nominal and real (bare bones and respectable) wages are doomed to frustration. That 
scepticism might well (as a model historical and statistical survey of nominal wage data 
available for 18th century India showed) be extended to the Mughal Empire.106 
 The authors of this seminal article have travelled down the right road. We hope that they 
might proceed beyond the present cul de sac. Perhaps, however, the current generation of 
economists and economic historians endeavouring to map and construct explanations for 
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the long run growth of the Chinese empire may have to recognize that the Kuznetian 
paradigm for quantification is simply not viable for the comprehension of Asia’s economies. 
Asia’s imperial states were neither strong nor efficient enough to collect data fit for the 
purpose of centralized governance and mutatis mutandis providing historians with wage data 
that are secure enough to facilitate macro-economic comparisons across Eurasia. Facts in 
the form of statistical information can travel but rarely in first class formats. 107 For pre-
modern times the content, contexts and contracts from which evidence for nominal wage 
rates emerge needs careful elucidation before more plausible conjectures about relative 
standards of living across the polities and cities of Eurasia can be drawn. 
 An alternative and potentially defendable conclusion could be drawn from this impressive 
body of nominal wage data collected by Moll-Murata and our own attempt to supplement that 
evidence with reference to secondary literature on pre-modern Chinese labour markets. That 
conclusion, or rather impression, would be that the payments system for unskilled labour 
during Qing times depended to a significant and persistent extent and degree on gongshi 
and gongjia. The former probably approximated to Allen’s ‘bare bones basket’ for 
subsistence for workers while they were on the job. The latter recorded in documents as 
nominal money wage rates was the supplement in cash earned and required by low skilled 
workers to maintain a family including themselves for the ‘months’ of the year when they 
were not gainfully employed and fed.108 
 For purposes of comparison to count the cash component as equivalent to wages paid to 
workers of comparable skills in European cities, would be to underestimate the ‘living wages’ 
or family incomes afforded to the tiny but low skilled proletariats of Qing China and Mughal 
India’s agrarian economies. 109 Perhaps, and as a recent and seminal text reveals, their 
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standards of living and place in economies of these empires expose very little that is 
significant for reciprocal comparisons between the Orient and Occident.110 
                                                          
110  This argument is elaborated in another paper, vide Deng and O’Brien, ‘Clarifying Data for Reciprocal 
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